Viability


 * Competitive Viability Assessment: TOR**

Unlike many other encryption protocols, TOR is completely free. Tor relies on its global network of repeater and exit nodes to provide users with free and anonymous access to information both on the internet and hosted using TOR's .onion URL scheme. The latter of these features is where TOR has power over the consumer. While there are certainly other options in the market for anonymous access to information, a great community of computer enthusiasts, libertarians, and privacy activists has openly embraced the [|.onion URL scheme]. This community has sprung up hoards sites that utilize this technology and as such can only be accessed through using TOR. This makes the switch from TOR to some other technology very unlikely as it would require time on the part of the service provider as well as the end-consumer.
 * Supplier Power**

By its very nature, TOR relies on its end users to provide internet access either as a repeater node or an exit node with only a small portion of users leeching off those who can provide these functions. With this in mind, consumers can easily disable their ability to repeat or exit communications and cripple the network as a whole. This power can allow consumers to demand certain features or policies to be implemented or could disrupt a certain service's ability to be accessed.
 * Buyer Power**

There are several suppliers of anonymous web access such as VPNs and other encrypted protocols such as Freenet or I2P. Out of these, Freenet and I2P stand out as the most similar services. While the competitive landscape is certainly littered with nearly identical services, TOR has one key advantage over the rest - sponsorship. As of [|2004], the Electronic Frontier Foundation, arguably the most influential and successful privacy-rights organization in the world, has sponsored TOR and proposed challenges for its members to setup the most number of relay nodes added to the TOR network.
 * Competitive Rivalry**

As noted above, there are several other competing technologies vying for individual's secure and anonymous access to information. That being said, unlike traditional 'clearnnet' sites, hidden services cannot cross the technical boundaries of one encrypted relay network to another. With this fairly high switching cost, it appears that hidden services with develop within specific niches and those niches will then be bound to that technology. While there are certainly minute technical differences that separate the various node-based networks, the end users are rarely cognisant of the benefits and shortcomings of each.
 * Substitute Products**

Functionality remains fairly consistent among the above mentioned internet anonymity / obfuscation technologies. The primary weakness that each has relates to the [|mixnet], or the transfer from the encrypted, tunneled network to the clearnet. The battle for technological dominance and market penetration has seemed to have come to a standstill. The battle will resume when a developer begins to figure out the issue of privacy at the point where the darknet and clearnet converge.
 * Intensity of Competition**